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HISTORY OF THE ALTERNATIVE DESEGREGATION PLAN AND
THE BLACK COMMUNITY'S PERSPECTIVE AND REACTION

JohannaMillerLewis*
I. INTRODUCTION

In the traditional tale of the Little Rock crisis, a "racially progressive"
southern city embraced the Brown v. Boardof Education' decision and prepared a court-approved school integration plan, only to be blindsided by
Governor Orval Faubus when he called out the Arkansas National Guard to
prevent the integration of Central High School. To make matters worse,
when nine African American teenagers attempted to enter the high school
through a hostile crowd of segregationists on September 4, 1957, and the
Guard turned them back, the national press corps preserved the entire episode for posterity in newspapers, on radio, and on television.
Little Rock, Arkansas, became world famous as an intolerant place.
Governor Faubus didn't seem to mind, however. Even after meeting with
President Eisenhower to negotiate a solution to the standoff, Faubus kept the
state militia in place and the nine black students out of Central High until
Judge Ronald Davies ordered him to stop using the Guard for that purpose.
Faubus complied, and when the Little Rock Nine entered Central High
through a side door on September 23 the crowd outside of the school almost
rioted until the police removed the black students from the school. Finally,
on September 24 President Dwight D. Eisenhower ended the stalemate and
upheld the United States Constitution when he ordered the United States
Army's renowned 101st Airborne Division to escort the now-famous Little
Rock Nine through the front doors of Central High School the next day.
This essay will (1) discuss the black community's perspective on the
Little Rock School Board's attempt to formulate a successful desegregation
plan and (2) suggest that had the white majority listened to the black community things might have been different.

* Professor of History and Coordinator of the Graduate Program in Public History at
the University of Arkansas at Little Rock; Ph.D., College of William and Mary, M.A. Wake
Forest University, A.B., Salem College.
1. 347 U.S. 886 (1954).
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II. HISTORY OF THE ALTERNATIVE DESEGREGATION PLAN

Throughout the summer of 1954 Associated Press reporter Bem Price
traveled around the South to watch the beginning of the end of legalized
segregation. He observed that even among the Negro "little people" the
Brown decision had provided them with "hope that segregation, the legal
badge of inferiority, was on its way out." But what those "little people" understood that most white Southerners did not was that the Supreme Court's
mandate for desegregation was just one legal method to correct a terrible
social problem.2
After the Brown decision, Little Rock dismantled segregation in a
number of public facilities. However, being able to drink out of the same
water fountain as white people-when you could not use the dressing room
or restaurant in the same department store-did not add up to racial progress
for African Americans, especially when most venues around the city continued to be segregated.3 Neither did checking books out of the local library, or
sitting at the front of the bus, or integrating a handful of African Americans
into three majority white school districts outside of central Arkansas.
More importantly, almost all of the advances that Arkansas made toward desegregation had occurred without any meaningful participation of
African Americans. The white power structure-in local school boards and
town councils, the state department of education, the governorship, the legislature, and even churches-continued to act unilaterally in what they undoubtedly considered to be "the best interest of Negroes"-without actually
consulting or empowering them. Consequently, when the white majority
witnessed the peaceful end of segregation in some of Little Rock's public
facilities and then saw the school board work on plans to integrate public
schools, they assumed that education would be no different.
Unlike Little Rock's white population, the black population had spent
six decades living with the reality that separate was not equal. The wellknown comparison between Little Rock's Central High School and segregated Dunbar High School (the first negro high school in Arkansas to gain
accreditation) clearly showed that black taxpayers helped pay $1.5 million
for "the most beautiful high school in America," complete with more classrooms, laboratories, an outdoor stadium, a larger library, and well paid faculty and administrators, while their own children attended a junior high
school, high school, and junior college combined in one smaller building
that cost $400,000 (most of which was raised from private sources) and had
2. Bern Price, Segregation Puzzle Fits No Pattern in Complex South, ARK. GAZETTE,
Sept. 12, 1954, at A8. Price identified those states as South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi,
and Louisiana.
3. Dorothy G. White, Letter to the Editor, ARK. STATE PREss, May 17, 1957, at 4.
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fewer classrooms, a more basic curriculum, a smaller library, no stadium or
gymnasium, and less well paid teachers and administrators.
Little Rock's black leaders, especially those actively involved in civil
rights and education, also knew of the huge cost and heroic effort behind the
Brown victory. As African Americans born in the Jim Crow South, they
realized that such a difficult court battle meant that the "real life" war to
desegregate schools could be even more costly. Consequently, in the three
years before Central desegregated, the NAACP in Little Rock and Arkansas
tried repeatedly to help Blossom and the school board create a plan and a
strategy that would withstand the segregationist onslaught, only to be ignored and rebuffed-with disastrous results for Little Rock.
On May 21, 1954, L.C. Bates editorialized about the possibilities
wrought by the Brown decision in the Arkansas State Press, the state-wide
African American newspaper with the largest circulation. Bates admitted he
was not overly optimistic that school integration would happen without a
challenge from white Southerners, but he did believe that the white children
of the South accepted the idea more than their elders. The editorial ended by
calling "for the leaders from the Negro race-leaders, not clabber mouths,
Uncle Toms, or grinning appeasers-to get together and counsel with the
school heads and try to get some relief from the school ills." He believed
that such cooperation would save not only time, money, and emotion but the
possibility of violence, also.4
That evening Bates attended a meeting of Little Rock's African American leaders (all men) convened by Virgil Blossom to discuss the Supreme
Court decision. Instead of asking the community leaders about their expectations for desegregation, Blossom spent most of the time explaining his ideas
for integration combined with a construction plan for some new schools in
the district. Finally, Blossom stopped talking and L.C. immediately asked
whether "the Board [intended] to integrate the schools in 1954?"
Blossom replied, "No, it must be done slowly. For instance, we must
complete the additional school buildings that are now being started." Bates
turned abruptly and walked out of the meeting.
Now, L.C. Bates was known to be a man of few words and cynical, but
he was not the problem. By Blossom's own account other men at the meeting expressed their displeasure at delaying implementation of the Supreme
Court decision.5 As one minister and NAACP member queried later: "What
are we waiting for? The Supreme Court has handed down a sweeping decision, an unqualified decision, a unanimous decision, a decision so direct and
4. After The Court's Decision-Now What?, ARK. STATE PRESS, May 21, 1954, at4.
5. VIRGIL T. BLOSSOM, IT HAS HAPPENED HERE 12 (1959); see also JOHN A. KIRK,
REDEFINING THE COLOR LINE: BLACK ACTIVISM IN LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, 1940-1970 93
(2002); GRIF STOCKLEY, DAISY BATES: CIVIL RIGHTS CRUSADER FROM ARKANSAS 67 (2005).
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unequivocal that it can be compressed into three words-SEGREGATION
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL., 6 On May 22, the school board announced that
it would develop school attendance zones and prepare to implement "a
sound school program on an integrated basis" while waiting for the Supreme
Court's guidelines. The executive committee of Little Rock's NAACP chapter welcomed the news and wanted to cooperate with the school board and
the superintendent in devising a successful desegregation plan for all residents of Little Rock.7 That summer Daisy Bates followed Blossom around to
every public speaking engagement he made about desegregating the school
district so the NAACP could devise ways to help; but she learned next to
nothing about what he and the school board had in mind.8
When September rolled around, the 1954-55 school year began in Little Rock without any black students enrolled in traditionally white schools. 9
The NAACP's state legal redress committee headed by Pine Bluff attorney
Wiley Branton paid a visit on the Little Rock School Board and asked the
district not to follow a "wait and see" policy on integration. In addition, the
school board's lack of willingness to consult with African Americans greatly concerned the lawyers. Branton informed the board that the NAACP expected and was willing to help "the Board... map plans for integration with
6. S.S. Taylor, What Are We Waiting For?,ARK.

STATE PRESS, July 2, 1954, at4.
7. Like many American cities, World War II profoundly affected Little Rock and its
environs. Thanks to the construction of a new Air Force Base in 1953, close to a 70% increase in population gave Little Rock approximately 100,000 residents by the mid- 1950s. Of
that population, almost 30% was African American and living in the east and southeast sections of the city, while 70% was Caucasian and living in the central and western portion of
the city. Not too surprisingly, as elsewhere in the United States, the population growth in
Little Rock coupled with the post-war baby boom stretched the physical facilities of the
school system to the limit. See C. Fred Williams, Class: The CentralIssue in the 1957 Little
Rock School Crisis, 56 ARK. HIST. Q. 341 (1997). According to a segment of The Negro and
the Schools printed in the Arkansas Gazette on May 16, 1954, Little Rock's black population
stood at 23% in 1950-a decline from 38.4% in 1940. Throughout the state the population
declined by 2% between 1940-1950, with the black population decreasing by 11.6% as the
white population increased by 1.1%.
The Little Rock School District was not only the largest district in the state; it also had
the highest percentage of black students in an urban area. Despite being headquarters for the
Arkansas State Conference of Branches of the NAACP (ASC), Little Rock did not have the
most radical African American population in the state; Pine Bluff did. Perhaps the more
moderate leadership in Little Rock's African American community and the school board of
this "progressive" city would be able to make desegregation work smoothly. In any event,
whatever happened in Little Rock would have a major impact on how the rest of the state
implemented the Supreme Court's decision. John N. Popham, Negro Parlay in South Asks
"Give and Take" to EndBias, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1954, at Al.
8. Interview by Elizabeth Jacoway with Daisy Bates (contained in the Southern Historical Collections, Documenting the South project at www.unc.edu).
9. School Registration Completed Quietly; No Racial Incidents, ARK. GAZETTE, Sept.
2, 1954.
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the aid of patrons, colored and white, and put them into effect as soon as
possible and with as little trouble as possible."' 10
Superintendent Blossom replied that the school district intended to do
the best possible job in crafting school attendance zones, and he even of-

fered to meet with Branton and the redress committee after completing the
desegregation studies in a month or two. The meeting never took place, and
the desegregation plan was not ready until late May 1955.11
During the last week of May 1955, Blossom announced his broad plan
for the "gradual integration" of the Little Rock School District. In the first
phase, high schools would integrate via "color blind" attendance zones-a
new west side school to open in the fall of 1957, the current Little Rock
Central High School, and a new east side school under construction and
scheduled to open in early 1956. In the second phase, junior high schools
would begin desegregation around 1960; and in the third phase, elementary
schools would desegregate after 1960.12
Unfortunately, that would all change on May 31, 1955, when the Supreme Court issued the Brown 113 implementation decision calling for
school districts to desegregate "on a racially non-discriminatory basis with
all deliberate speed."' 4 In Little Rock, the ruling signaled an abrupt change
10. School Board to Discuss Integration with NAACP, ARK. GAZETTE, Aug. 27, 1954, at
Al; Negro Group Is Assured Little Rock Will Integrate, ARK. GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 1954, at
Al; Same Soup Warmed Over When Local School Board Evades Petitioners, ARK. STATE
PRESS, Sept. 17, 1954, at 1,4.
11. Little Rock's population of 102,000 was approximately 25% African American.
Little Rock School District enrollment in 1953-54 was 17,354, of which 24.2% was African
American. SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS 1:2 (Oct. 1954), at 3. The other lawyers accompanying
Branton were: Chris Mercer, Thad Williams, George Howard, Jr., and Jackie Shropshire.
Negro Group Is Assured Little Rock Will Integrate, ARK. GAZETTE, Sept. 10, 1954, at Al;
Same Soup Warmed Over When Local School BoardEvades Petitioners, ARK. STATE PRESS,
Sept. 17, 1954, at 1, 4. Blossom mistakenly placed his quote in this story about "not delaying
for delay's sake" into his May 1954 meeting with African American ministers in his autobiography (p. 13), and the mistake has been repeated by Kirk and Stockley. See KIRK, supranote
5, at 93; STOCKLEY, supra note 5, at 68; see also Integration Blueprint Prepared,ARK.
DEMOCRAT, Sept. 10, 1954, at 14 (emphasizing that a plan would be ready in thirty to sixty
days and called the group which met with the School Board "parents and lawyers."). Attorney Chris Mercer had children in the Little Rock district. The meeting never took place, and
the desegregation plan was not ready until late May 1955.
12.

BLOSSOM, supra note 5, at 23.

13. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
14. Brent J. Aucoin, The Southern Manifesto and Southern Opposition to Desegregation, 55 ARK. HIST. Q. 173, 185 (1996). There was reason to be optimistic about Arkansas.
Two school districts in the northwest region of the state already had desegregated without
any problems. In addition, of the state's 75 counties, fifteen of them did not have black students in public schools, and 22 others had black student enrollment of less than 10%, which
indicated they would have little to no trouble desegregating. The remaining 37 counties had
black student enrollment ranging between I1 to 60.5%, with the higher percentages located in
the southeastern portion of Arkansas.
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to Superintendent Blossom's plan. The Southern School News acknowledged that while the plan was "news" to the general public, Blossom had
presented the desegregation plan to numerous civic and community organizations to answer their questions and listen to their suggestions. Unfortunately, neither Blossom nor the school board nor the Southern School News
ever discussed the current proposal directly with the NAACP. Instead, the
reporter stated, "The integration plan is subject to final approval by the Little Rock School Board, and, in a sense, by Negro leaders. Thus far, there has
5
been no indication that the NAACP is unhappy with the Little Rock plan."'
To complicate matters further, at some point over the summer of 1955
numerous sources indicated that the Little Rock School Board substantially
changed the Blossom plan. In addition to moving the starting date for integration back to 1957 or 1958, Blossom made all Negro teacher assignments
to Horace Mann High School and all white teacher assignments to Central,

According to coverage in the Southern School News, "Educational, racial and political
leaders in Arkansas generally were pleased" with the Brown II ruling, as it closely resembled
the friend-of-the-court brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court by T. Gentry, the
state Attorney General. Little Rock school superintendent Virgil Blossom described the decision as "reasonable" because it set no deadline for integration and added, "I think it will work
out." Wiley Branton, chairman of the Legal Redress Committee of the ASC, believed some
lawsuits demanding integration still would be filed in Arkansas. Daisy Bates, however, said
that "as long as we feel that the school boards are working in good faith and including members of the NAACP in their planning for integration, we are willing to work with them." She
noted that the membership wanted "complete" integration in Little Rock and elsewhere.
Considering that neither the ASC of the NAACP nor the Little Rock chapter had been included in planning for integration at any level, Mrs. Bates may have been firing a nicely
articulated warning shot across the Little Rock School District's bow.
15. BLOSSOM, supra note 5, at 21-22; ELIZABETH JACOWAY, TURN AWAY THY SON:
LITTLE ROCK, THE CRISIS THAT SHOCKED THE NATION 52 (2007). Blossom gives the date of
May 24, 1955, in his book; Jacoway uses May 22. Members of the school board voted in
favor of the plan unanimously. The board included the following: Dr. Cooper, Mrs. Edgar
Dixon, Dr. Dale Alford, Harold Engstrom, Jr., R.A. Lile, and Mrs. Arthur E. McLean. Blossom mentions, however, that some members opposed the plan, "but they voted for the plan
because the Board's attorneys assured them that it represented a legal minimum of compliance with the law."
Blossom also claimed to have "the co-operation of probably 95 percent of the Negro citizens" in creating the desegregation plan. BLOSSOM, supra note 5, at 13; STOCKLEY, supra
note 5, at 68; see also SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS 2:1 (July 1955), at 3. John Kirk also maintained that Horace Mann would have an all-black faculty and Hall would have an all-white
faculty, making Central High School the focus of desegregation. See KRK, supra note 5, at
96.
In Bigger Than Little Rock, author Robert Brown maintained that Blossom radically
changed the plan after Brown 11 without soliciting additional community in-put, and he refused to perceive desegregation as anything but a school concern, rather than a larger city,
state, and even national problem. ROBERT RAYMOND BROWN, BIGGER THAN LITTLE ROCK 54

(1958).
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Technical High, and Hall High (the new school on the west side). 16 By virtue of placing an all-black teaching staff at Horace Mann, it became the
"negro" school. White students (but not black students) could apply for "exceptions" to the attendance zones. In the end Mann would be black, Hall
would be white, and Central High School would become the focus of desegregation in the fall of 1957.
On July 10, 1955, the NAACP formed a special committee that included the parents of some students to express their disapproval of Blossom's "vague" proposal-especially in regard to desegregating elementary
schools-to the school board on July 28. At that meeting the committee
asked the school board to begin a program of racial integration in September
1955. School board President Dr. William G. Cooper thanked the group and
pledged to respond to their request in a week or so.' 7 Nothing happened.
Tired of waiting for change, six months later on Monday, January 23,
1956, twenty-seven black students appeared at four white Little Rock public
schools-the schools closest to their homes-(two high schools, one junior
high, and an elementary school) and requested transfers for the spring semester.1 8 Not only had parents wearied to the lack of accurate information coming from Superintendent Blossom's office:
[T]hey were tired of exposing their little children to all weather and traffic hazards and passing schools in their immediate vicinity to get to
schools designated Negro in defiance of the law of the land. They stated
they were tired of having their children denied
technical training when
9
such training is made available for others.'
After being referred to the Superintendent, Blossom denied the students' request based on set policy.20 The actions of these students initiated
16. Working-class white citizens complained that Blossom's plan favored Little Rock's
elite, whose children would attend the newly completed Hall High School. JACOWAY, supra
note 15, at 52.
17. SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS 2:2, August 1955. In mid-June the Arkansas NAACP
adopted a policy on integration in which they contacted every school district in the state with
Negro children enrolled and requested that they adopt a plan for desegregation immediately.
For those school districts that the NAACP had petitioned for desegregation a year earlier the
ASC sent a letter reminding the school boards of the Supreme Court's May 31 decision. ARK
STATE PRESS, June 17, 1955, at 1.
18. Eight female students from Horace Mann High School attempted to enroll at Central
High School; one male student attempted to enroll at Tech High School; four students tried to
enroll at Forest Heights Junior High; and fourteen students tried to enroll at Forest Heights
Elementary School. Carl Childress, Negroes Try to Enroll in City Schools; Rebuffed, ARK.
DEMOCRAT, Jan. 23, 1956, at 1.
19. Blossom, School Board Members Are Defendants, ARK. STATE PRESS, Feb. 10, 1956,
at 1. The mention of technical training referred to the lack of an auto mechanics course at
Horace Mann after the instructor quit.
20. SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, Feb. 1956, at 11.
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the Aaron v. Cooper21 case in which the parents of the students (represented
by Pine Bluff attorney Wiley Branton 22) challenged the school district to let
black students into white schools immediately rather than waiting for the
Blossom plan.
Satisfied with the Blossom plan, the Little Rock School Board and Superintendent Blossom were shocked that these black parents could not wait a
little longer to send their children to white schools. In fact, school board
attorneys found this lack of patience so unusual for Little Rock's African
American population that their initial defense strategy centered on proving
that the NAACP's "aggressive" national office in New York was really behind the case. In a memo written to the defense team, lead attorney A.E.
House stated as follows: "It seems to me that when [the] NAACP comes
into a community like Little Rock and starts dictating what is a reasonable
23
time to accomplish integration, it may be opening itself to criticism.,
What the school board, Virgil Blossom, or the defense attorneys did
not understand was that African Americans were tired of waiting, and not
just to integrate white schools, but to have the equal facilities of their own
promised by Plessy v. Ferguson.24 Throughout the spring of 1956 the school
district continued to treat Negro students separately, but they had a difficult
time treating them equally. At the March meeting, the Little Rock School
Board designated two new "Negro" schools for the next school year: Horace
Mann High School, which may have been new but still was not the equal of
Central High, and Pfeiffer Camp, which was needed to relieve the overcrowding at George Washington Carver Elementary School. Over at the
Arkansas State Press, Associate Editor Rev. S.S. Taylor noticed and took
offense. In a column titled "We Don't Like 'Negro Schools'," Taylor wrote:
The Negro believes that the only reason for calling a school "negro" is to
induce Negro children to stay in and white to stay out. The Negro parent
whose children have to walk past one school to get to another and then
21. 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958), rev'd257 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1958).
22. In addition to Branton, the legal team included U. Simpson Tate of Dallas, and
Thurgood Marshall and Robert L. Carter of New York. The plaintiff school children ranged
in age from six to eighteen. John Aaron, who along with his sister Thelma was a plaintiff,
was the first-named plaintiff because the children were listed alphabetically; thus, he is the
"Aaron" of the case name. Clyde Bates, the son of L.C. Bates, was another one of the plaintiffs. The defendants were the president (William G. Cooper) and secretary of the Little Rock
School District, the superintendent of schools, and the district. Lawyers A.F. House, Frank E.
Chowning, Leon B. Catlett, Henry E. Spitzberg, and Richard C. Butler represented the defendants. Lynn Foster, Aaron v. Cooper, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARKANSAS HISTORY AND
CULTURE,

available

at

http://www.encyclopediaofarkansas.net/encyclopedia/entry-

detail.aspx?entryID=74 1.
23.

TONY A.

FREYER,

LITTLE ROCK ON TRIAL:

COOPER

DESEGREGATION 49 (2007); JACOwAY, supra note 15, at 54.

24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

V. AARON

AND

SCHOOL
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not be permitted to study fundamental subjects in the school farther distant, is the original reason for the first fight for equality and finally for
integration. If equality of facilities had been given a modicum of attention long ago, the question of integration would never have arisen. 25
The lack of equality in Little Rock schools was not limited to buildings, either. For example, the board voted to repair all of the band instruments from Dunbar High School for $1,500 so they could be used at Horace
Mann High School because Dunbar Junior High School did not have a
band. 26 And yet the board purchased $8,500 worth of new musical instruments for Southwest Junior High School when it opened.27
In March, the board also divided up the old library books at Dunbar
High School between Horace Mann High School and Dunbar Junior High.
They donated the books used by the now-defunct Dunbar Junior College to
Philander Smith College. 28 When the board later approved a mandatory Junior High School Reading Materials list for school libraries, Dunbar needed
more books than any of the white junior high schools just to meet the minimum requirements. Forest Heights Junior High School, a new school located in the so-called "silk-stocking district," needed the fewest books because parents privately purchased books for the library.
The list of inequities at Little Rock's "colored schools" could go on
and on. Dunbar's sports teams had no "official schedule" of games with
neighboring schools, but East Side, West Side, Pulaski Heights, Forest
Heights and Southwest junior high schools played against each other as well
as Catholic High School, and two schools in North Little Rock-Fourth
Street and Jefferson Davis. 29 But Little Rock's Negroes had no recourse: no
one represented them on the school board, nor did any African American
teachers or administrators attend school board meetings.
Clueless to the real conditions under which African American children
labored to get an education in Little Rock schools, the defense trial team
decided to depose Little Rock NAACP Chapter President Rev. J.C. Crenchaw and ASC President Daisy Bates in May 1956 to show that the "total
and immediate integration" of Little Rock public schools was unfeasible.
Mrs. Bates's testimony revealed that despite the numerous times African Americans had courtesy meetings with the school board about desegregation, nothing substantive ever resulted. And when informed, "There is no
25. S.S. Taylor, We Don't Like "Negro Schools," ARK. STATE PRESs, Apr. 13, 1956, at
4. The Little Rock chapter of the NAACP did not like the racial designation, either, and protested to the school board. SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS, May 1956.
26. Little Rock Board of Education Meeting Minutes, Mar. 29, 1956.
27. Little Rock Board of Education Meeting Minutes, May 29, 1956.
28. Little Rock Board of Education Meeting Minutes, Mar. 29, 1956. The board pledged
to buy new books for each school to fill the gaps in their collection.
29. Little Rock Board of Education Meeting Minutes, Nov. 29, 1956.
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Rev. Crenchaw replied, "There
law that says integration will be immediate,"
30
either.,
gradual
be
will
it
says
that
is none
To make matters worse, if anyone questioned exactly how progressive
Little Rock was in terms of race at this time, one of the defense lawyersostensibly a "law and order" moderate who endorsed desegregationrepeatedly referred to African Americans in open court as "niggers" until
Mrs. Bates "reminded [him of] the correct pronunciation of the word Negro." While she had the attorney's attention, Bates also instructed him to
address her as "Mrs. Bates" and not presume to call her "Daisy." "That is
something that is reserved for my intimate friends and my husband. This
morning3 1is the first time I ever saw you, you will refrain from calling me
Daisy."
Of course, relationships between whites and blacks of the opposite sex
had always been a difficult situation. While legions of light skinned Negroes
resulted from the pregnancies of enslaved women by their owners in the
antebellum period, and "intimate" relationships between domestic servants
and their male employers after that, segregationists focused on miscegenation or race-mixing as one of the major dangers of school desegregation.
When minister and Capital Citizens' Council member Wesley Pruden asked
the school board about the relationship between Negro boys and white girls
that might happen when Central High desegregated, L.C. Bates quipped,
"Evidently the relationship between the white male species and the Negro
femmes is so well established
and has produced so many offspring, that it
32
needs no clarification.,
In late August 1956, federal Judge John Miller dismissed the suit on
the basis that the Blossom plan was adequate and would "lead to an effective and gradual adjustment of the problem." Miller also gave the court jurisdiction over the case in the event that "further orders ... may be necessary to obtain the effectuation of the plan." The parents' lawyers appealed
the decision, and the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Judge Miller's
ruling that Little Rock's desegregation plan was sufficient.
While neither the parents nor the Little Rock chapter of the NAACP
got what they wanted, Wiley Branton mentioned that "some aspects" of the
appellate court's decision pleased him: "The courts have given us a cloak of
protection against some die-hard, anti-integration groups who might still try
to delay integration." The "cloak of protection" would become the lynch pin
30. JOHNNY E. WILLIAMS, AFRICAN AMERICAN RELIGION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN ARKANSAS 109-10 (1994); Charles Allbright, ARK. GAZETTE, May 5, 1956, at

A2.
31. State Headsfor Integration Now: Both Nix on School Board's Plan if It Doesn 't
Contain Immediate Integration, ARK. STATE PRESS, May 11, 1956, at 1. See also STOCKLEY,
supra note 5, at 9. Jacoway fails to mention this incident in her book.
32. This, We Believe, ARK. STATE PRESS, July 12, 1957, at 1.
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in enforcing a Supreme Court decision in Little Rock that only African
Americans wanted but the entire nation needed.
III. CONCLUSION: A FAILURE TO LISTEN
In early summer 1956 Little Rock School Superintendent Virgil Blossom made a public speech purporting that gradual school desegregation
complied with the law, met the standards established by court decisions, and
would preserve good race relations. In an editorial L.C. Bates made it clear
...that speakers who speak of good "race relations" between the white
and Negro, are just a little out of line in their interpretation ....[W]hat
they really mean, is "powerful non-resistant white domination." The
he will not exert any
power to keep the Negro meek and humble, where
33
action that is contrary to the white man's will.
Bates also took Blossom to task for saying he knew what the "colored
race" wanted. If Blossom really knew what the Negro wants, Bates maintained, he would "know that the Negro is an American citizen, and wants to
the federal
share in the privileges and opportunities guaranteed him under
34
constitution, and live his life as any other American citizen.,
Had Mr. Blossom, the school board, and the majority of Little Rock's
white population actually considered what African Americans thought about
desegregation and acted upon that knowledge, rather than acting "in their
best interest," the white majority would have been better prepared to challenge the segregationists' attempts to stop the integration of Central High
School at all costs. Instead, they chose to assume that school desegregation
would move forward in the same peaceful manner in which segregation
ended in the city's buses and libraries. So they made their plan, defended it
in court, and waited.
By remaining silent, the white majority chose to believe the myth that
Little Rock really was a racially progressive city and that the desegregation
of Central High School would not be a problem. The myth may have convinced fellow believers but not the well-organized and extremely vocal
members and supporters of the Capital Citizens' Council or the newlyformed Mothers' League of Central High School.
Instead, the segregationists, who probably did not outnumber the silent
majority, took action to bombard Governor Faubus with letters, telegrams,
and phone calls demanding that desegregation be stopped. They helped convince the Governor to block the court-ordered integration of Central High
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School with the Arkansas National Guard while the rest of the city sat paralyzed and the world watched.

